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Abstract
This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-puriﬁability of mixed strate-
gies in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb
the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoﬀ shock which
is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We
focus on the puriﬁability of a class of one-period memory mixed strategy
equilibria used by Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) in their study of the repeated
prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring. We ﬁnd that the strategy proﬁle
is puriﬁable by perturbed-game ﬁnite-memory strategies if and only if it is
strongly symmetric, in the sense that after every history, both players play
the same mixed action. Thus “most” strategy proﬁles are not puriﬁable by
ﬁnite memory strategies. However, if we allow inﬁnite memory strategies in
the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is puriﬁable.
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1 Introduction
Harsanyi’s (1973) puriﬁcation theorem is one of the most compelling justiﬁcations
for the study of mixed equilibria in ﬁnite normal form games. Under this justi-
ﬁcation, the complete-information normal form game is viewed as the limit of a
sequence of incomplete-information games, where each player’s payoﬀs are subject
to private shocks. Harsanyi proved that every equilibrium (pure or mixed) of the
original game is the limit of equilibria of close-by games with incomplete infor-
mation. Moreover, in the incomplete-information games, players have essentially
strict best replies, and so will not randomize. Consequently, a mixed strategy
equilibrium can be viewed as a pure strategy equilibrium of any close-by game
of incomplete information. Harsanyi’s (1973) argument exploits the regularity (a
property stronger than local uniqueness) of equilibria of “almost all” normal form
games. As long as payoﬀ shocks generate small changes in the system of equations
characterizing equilibrium, the regularity of equilibria ensures that the perturbed
game has an equilibrium close to any equilibrium of the unperturbed game.1
Very little work has examined puriﬁcation in dynamic games. Even in ﬁnite
extensive games, generic local uniqueness of equilibria may be lost when we build in
natural economic features into the game, such as imperfect observability of moves
and time separability of payoﬀs. Bhaskar (2000) has shown how these features
may lead to a failure of local uniqueness and puriﬁcation: i.e., for a generic choice
of payoﬀs, there is a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria, none of which are
the limit of the pure strategy equilibria of a game with payoﬀ perturbations.
For inﬁnitely repeated games, the bootstrapping nature of the system of equa-
tions describing many of the inﬁnite horizon equilibria is conducive to a failure
of local uniqueness of equilibria. We study a class of symmetric one-period mem-
ory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) in their study of
the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with private monitoring. This class fails local
uniqueness quite dramatically: there is a two dimensional manifold of equilibria.
Our motivation for studying the puriﬁability of this class of strategies comes
from the recent literature on repeated games with private monitoring. Equilib-
rium incentive constraints in games with private monitoring are diﬃcult to verify
because calculating best replies typically requires understanding the nature of play-
ers’ beliefs about the private histories of other players. Piccione (2002) showed
that by introducing just the right amount of mixing in every period, a player’s
best replies can be made independent of his beliefs, and thus beliefs become irrel-
evant.2 This means in particular that these equilibria of the perfect monitoring
game trivially extend to the game with private monitoring. Piccione’s (2002)
1See Govindan, Reny, and Robson (2003) for a modern exposition and generalization of
Harsanyi (1973).
2This was not the ﬁrst use of randomization in repeated games with private monitoring. A
number of papers construct nontrivial equilibria using initial randomizations to instead generate
uncertainty over which the players can then update(Bhaskar and Obara (2002), Bhaskar and van
Damme (2002), and Sekiguchi (1997)).
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strategies depend on the inﬁnite history of play. Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) showed
that it suﬃces to consider simple strategies which condition only upon one period
memory of both players’ actions. These strategies again make a player indiﬀerent
between his actions regardless of the action taken by the other player, and thus
a player’s incentives do not change with his beliefs. Kandori and Obara (2003)
also use such strategies to obtain stronger eﬃciency results via private strategies
in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
At ﬁrst glance, the equilibria of Piccione (2002) and Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2002)
involve unreasonable randomizations: in some cases, a player is required to ran-
domize diﬀerently after two histories, even though the player has identical beliefs
over the continuation play of the opponent.3 Moreover, the randomizations in-
volve a delicate intertemporal trade-oﬀ. While there are many ways of modelling
payoﬀ shocks in a dynamic game, these shocks should not violate the structure
of dynamic game. In repeated games, a reasonable constraint is that the payoﬀs
shocks should be independently and identically distributed over time, and more-
over, the period t shock should only be realized at the beginning of period t. Our
question is: Do the delicate intertemporal trade-oﬀs survive these independently
and identically distributed shocks?
Our results show that, in the repeated game with perfect monitoring, most
(but not all) of the Ely-Va¨lima¨ki equilibria can only be puriﬁed by inﬁnite hori-
zon strategies, i.e., strategies that are no simpler than those of Piccione (2002).
However, while equilibria of the unperturbed perfect monitoring game are au-
tomatically equilibria of the unperturbed private monitoring game, our puriﬁca-
tion arguments do not automatically extend to the private monitoring case. We
conjecture—but have not been able to prove—that in the repeated game with
private monitoring all the Ely-Valimaki equilibria will be not be puriﬁable with
ﬁnite history strategies but will be puriﬁable with inﬁnite history strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the completely mixed
equilibria of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma introduced by Ely and Va¨lima¨ki
(2002). The positive and negative puriﬁcation results for ﬁnite history strategies
are in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the positive puriﬁcation result for inﬁnite
history strategies. Finally, in Section 5, we brieﬂy discuss the private monitoring
case.
3Anticipating the notation from the next section, this occurs, for example, when g =  (the
incentive to play D is independent of the action of the opponent), so that pCC = pDC and
pCD = pDD.
2
2 Belief-free Equilibria with Perfect Monitoring
Let Γ (0) denote the inﬁnitely-repeated perfect-monitoring prisoners’ dilemma with
stage game:
C D
C 1, 1 −, 1 + g
D 1 + g,− 0, 0
Each player has a discount rate δ. The class of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria
Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) construct can be described as follows: The proﬁles have
one-period memory, with players randomizing in each period with probability paa′
on C after the action proﬁle aa′. The proﬁle is constructed so that after each action
proﬁle, the player is indiﬀerent between C and D. Consequently, a player’s best
replies are independent of his beliefs about the opponent’s history, and in this sense
the equilibria are, to use the language introduced by Ely, Ho¨rner, and Olszewski
(2003) “belief-free.” The requirement that after aa′, player 1 is indiﬀerent between
playing C and D, when player 2 is playing pa′a yields the following system (where
Waa′ is the value to a player after aa′, and the second equality in each displayed
equation comes from the indiﬀerence requirement):
WCC = (1− δ) (pCC + (1− pCC) (−)) + δ {pCCWCC + (1− pCC)WCD} (1)
= (1− δ) pCC (1 + g) + δ {pCCWDC + (1− pCC)WDD} , (2)
WCD = (1− δ) (pDC + (1− pDC) (−)) + δ {pDCWCC + (1− pDC)WCD}(3)
= (1− δ) pDC (1 + g) + δ {pDCWDC + (1− pDC)WDD} , (4)
WDC = (1− δ) (pCD + (1− pCD) (−)) + δ {pCDWCC + (1− pCD)WCD}(5)
= (1− δ) pCD (1 + g) + δ {pCDWDC + (1− pCD)WDD} , (6)
and
WDD = (1− δ) (pDD + (1− pDD) (−)) + δ {pDDWCC + (1− pDD)WCD}(7)
= (1− δ) pDD (1 + g) + δ {pDDWDC + (1− pDD)WDD} . (8)
Subtracting (2) from (1) gives
0 = pCC {(1− δ) (−g + ) + δ [(WCC −WCD)− (WDC −WDD)]}−(1− δ) +δWCD−δWDD.
Similarly,
0 = pDC {(1− δ) (−g + ) + δ [(WCC −WCD)− (WDC −WDD)]}−(1− δ) +δWCD−δWDD,
0 = pCD {(1− δ) (−g + ) + δ [(WCC −WCD)− (WDC −WDD)]}−(1− δ) +δWCD−δWDD,
and
0 = pDD {(1− δ) (−g + ) + δ [(WCC −WCD)− (WDC −WDD)]}−(1− δ) +δWCD−δWDD.
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Since at least two of the probabilities diﬀer (if not, paa′ = 0 for all aa′), the
coeﬃcient of paa′ and the constant term are both zero:
WCD −WDD = (1− δ) 
δ
(9)
and
WCC −WDC = (1− δ) (g − )
δ
+ WCD −WDD
=
(1− δ) g
δ
. (10)
Ely and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) instead work with the values to a player of having his
opponent play C and D this period, VˆC and VˆD. A player is indiﬀerent between
C and D when the opponent plays C if
VˆC ≡ (1− δ) + δWCC
= (1− δ) (1 + g) + δWDC ,
while he is indiﬀerent between C and D when the opponent plays D if
VˆD ≡ (1− δ) (−) + δWCD
= δWDD.
These two equalities are equivalent to (9) and (10), and so (1-8) imply the player
is indiﬀerent between C and D, when the opponent is playing C this period, and
when he is playing D this period.
Under (9) and (10), the eight equations (1-8) reduce to four (substituting for
WDC and WDD):
WCC = (1− δ) (pCC + (1− pCC) (−)) + δ {pCCWCC + (1− pCC)WCD} , (11)
WCD = (1− δ) (pDC + (1− pDC) (−)) + δ {pDCWCC + (1− pDC)WCD} , (12)
WCC = (1− δ) (pCD + (1− pCD) (−) + g/δ) + δ {pCDWCC + (1− pCD)WCD} ,
(13)
and
WCD = (1− δ) (pDD + (1− pDD) (−) + /δ) + δ {pDDWCC + (1− pDD)WCD} .
(14)
Treating WCC and WCD parametrically, each equation determines a probability,
and so we have a two dimensional manifold of equilibria (the proof is in the Ap-
pendix):
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Theorem 1 There is a two-dimensional manifold of mixed equilibria of the inﬁnitely-
repeated perfect monitoring prisoners’ dilemma: Suppose WCC , WCD ∈ (0, 1) sat-
isfy the inequalities
WCD − δWCC < 1− δ, (15)
δWCD + (1− δ) g/δ < (1− δ)  + WCC , and (16)
(1− δ)  < δWCD. (17)
Then, the proﬁle in which player 1 plays C with probability paa′ and player 2 plays
C with probability pa′a after aa′ in the previous period (and both players play pCC
in the ﬁrst period), where
pCC =
(1− δ)  + WCC − δWCD
(1− δ) (1 + ) + δ (WCC −WCD) , (18)
pDC =
(1− δ)  + WCD − δWCD
(1− δ) (1 + ) + δ (WCC −WCD) , (19)
pCD =
(1− δ) (− g/δ) + WCC − δWCD
(1− δ) (1 + ) + δ (WCC −WCD) , (20)
and
pDD =
(1− δ)  (1− 1/δ) + WCD − δWCD
(1− δ) (1 + ) + δ (WCC −WCD) , (21)
is an equilibrium. Moreover, (15), (16), and (17) are satisﬁed for any 0 < WCD <
WCC < 1, for δ suﬃciently close to 1.
Indeed, for each speciﬁcation of behavior in the ﬁrst period, there is a two-
dimensional manifold of equilibria. Our analysis applies to all of these manifolds,
and for simplicity, we focus on the proﬁles where both players play pCC in the ﬁrst
period.
For later reference, it is useful to note that, using (9) and (10), the expressions
for the probabilities can be written as, for all aa′,
paa′ =
Wa′a − δWDD
(1− δ) (1 + g) + δ (WDC −WDD) . (22)
3 Finite memory purification
We now argue that if we require that the equilibrium of the perturbed game have
ﬁnite history dependence, then it is only possible to purify equilibria of the type
described in Section 2 when they are strongly symmetric (ie., when pCD = pDC).
Let Γ (ε) denote the inﬁnitely-repeated perfect-monitoring prisoners’ dilemma
with stage game:
C D
C 1 + εz1t , 1 + εz
2
t − + εz1t , 1 + g
D 1 + g,− + εz2t 0, 0
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The payoﬀ shock zit is private to player i, realized in period t, uniformly distributed
on [0, 1], independently and identically distributed across players, and histories.
We begin by considering one period memory strategy proﬁles, where the prob-
ability of a player playing C after observing the action proﬁle aa′ last period
is denoted by πεaa′ . For simplicity we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria,
where both players adopt the same strategy. Finally, we focus on completely mixed
equilibria, where πεaa′ ∈ (0, 1) for every action proﬁle aa′.
Denote the marginal type by zˆit. If z
t
i ≥ zˆit, then i plays C, and plays D
otherwise. Then the probability of C is Pr
{
zit ≥ zˆit
}
= 1− zˆit.
Let W εaa′ denote the ex ante value function of a player at the action proﬁle aa
′,
before the realization of his payoﬀ shock. The ex post payoﬀ from C after CC,
and given the realization of z1t , is
V εCC
(
z1t ;C
)
= (1− δ){πεCC − (1− πεCC)  + εz1t }+δ {πεCCW εCC + (1− πεCC)W εCD} ,
while the payoﬀ from D after CC is
V εCC
(
z1t ;D
)
= (1− δ)πεCC (1 + g) + δ {πεCCW εDC + (1− πεCC)W εDD} . (23)
Since zˆ1t is indiﬀerent,
(1− δ){πεCC − (1− πεCC)  + εzˆ1t }+ δ {πεCCW εCC + (1− πεCC)W εCD}
= (1− δ)πεCC (1 + g) + δ {πεCCW εDC + (1− πεCC)W εDD} ,
and since πεCC = 1− zˆ1t ,
(1− δ) {πεCC − (1− πεCC) (− ε)}+ δ {πεCCW εCC + (1− πεCC)W εCD}
= (1− δ)πεCC (1 + g) + δ {πεCCW εDC + (1− πεCC)W εDD} ,
or
(1− δ) {πεCCg + (1− πεCC) (− ε)} = δ {πεCC (W εCC −W εDC) + (1− πεCC) (W εCD −W εDD)} .
Collecting terms gives
0 = {(1− δ) (g −  + ε)− δ (W εCC −W εDC − (W εCD −W εDD))}πεCC (24)
+ (1− δ) (− ε)− δ (W εCD −W εDD) .
Similarly, the payoﬀ from C after DD is
(1− δ){πεDD − (1− πεDD)  + εz1t }+ δ {πεDDW εCC + (1− πεDD)W εCD} ,
while the payoﬀ from D after DD is
(1− δ)πεDD (1 + g) + δ {πεDDW εDC + (1− πεDD)W εDD} .
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Since zˆ1t is indiﬀerent,
(1− δ){πεDD − (1− πεDD)  + εzˆ1t }+ δ {πεDDW εCC + (1− πεDD)W εCD}
= (1− δ)πεDD (1 + g) + δ {πεDDW εDC + (1− πεDD)W εDD} ,
and since πεDD = 1− zˆ1t ,
(1− δ) {πεDD − (1− πεDD) (− ε)}+ δ {πεDDW εCC + (1− πεDD)W εCD}
= (1− δ)πεDD (1 + g) + δ {πεDDW εDC + (1− πεDD)W εDD} ,
or
(1− δ) {πεDDg + (1− πεDD) (− ε)}
= δ {πεDD (W εCC −W εDC) + (1− πεDD) (W εCD −W εDD)} .
Collecting terms gives
0 = {(1− δ) (g −  + ε)− δ (W εCC −W εDC − (W εCD −W εDD))}πεDD (25)
+ (1− δ) (− ε)− δ (W εCD −W εDD) .
Since the equations (24) and (25) have the same structure, if πεCC = πεDD, it
must be that the coeﬃcient of πε and the constant are both zero:
(1− δ) (g −  + ε)− δ (W εCC −W εDC − (W εCD −W εDD)) = 0
and
(1− δ) (− ε)− δ (W εCD −W εDD) = 0. (26)
In other words,
W εCD −W εDD =
(1− δ) (− ε)
δ
(27)
and
W εCC −W εDC =
(1− δ) g
δ
. (28)
Turning to the other histories, the payoﬀ from C after CD (so that the oppo-
nent sees the history DC) is
(1− δ){πεDC − (1− πεDC)  + εz1t }+ δ {πεDCW εCC + (1− πεDC)W εCD} ,
while the payoﬀ from D after CD is
(1− δ)πεDC (1 + g) + δ {πεDCW εDC + (1− πεDC)W εDD} .
Since zˆ1t is indiﬀerent,
(1− δ){πεDC − (1− πεDC)  + εzˆ1t }+ δ {πεDCW εCC + (1− πεDC)W εCD}
= (1− δ)πεDC (1 + g) + δ {πεDCW εDC + (1− πεDC)W εDD} ,
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and since πεCD = 1− zˆ1t ,
(1− δ) {πεDC − (1− πεDC)  + ε (1− πεCD)}+ δ {πεDCW εCC + (1− πεDC)W εCD}
= (1− δ)πεDC (1 + g) + δ {πεDCW εDC + (1− πεDC)W εDD} ,
or
0 = {(1− δ) (g −  + ε)− δ (W εCC −W εDC − (W εCD −W εDD))}πεDC (29)
+ {(1− δ) (− ε)− δ (W εCD −W εDD)}+ ε(1− δ)(πεCD − πεDC).
The ﬁrst two terms in the above equation have the same structure as in (24),
and since the constant term and the coeﬃcient on πε in (24) are both zero, these
two terms vanish. Thus (29) cannot be true for ε > 0 unless πεCD = π
ε
DC .
Theorem 2 Let p be a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game with complete in-
formation that has one period memory (such as an Ely-Valimaki strategy proﬁle).
If pa ∈ (0, 1) and pCC = pDD and pCD = pDC , then there exists ε¯ > 0 such that
for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯), there is no equilibrium of Γ (ε) with ﬁnite memory within ε¯ of p.
Proof. Fix δ = 12 min {pa, 1− pa, |pCD − pDC | , |pCC − pDD|}. Consider a pro-
ﬁle with memory K, and suppose it is within δ of p. Let πεh be the probability
of C after the history h. Then, πεh ∈ (0, 1) for all h ∈ {C,D}2K , πεhCC = πεhDD
and πεhDC = πεhCD. Then the contradiction obtained above for 1-period pro-
ﬁles also arises after the four histories hCC, hCD, hDC, and hDD, where h ∈
{C,D}2(K−1).
We have established that if pCC and pDD are distinct, a necessary condition
for puriﬁability by ﬁnite memory strategies is that p must be strongly symmetric,
i.e. both players must play the same continuation strategy after every history,
even if this history is asymmetric.
3.1 Purification when pDC = pCD
It is possible to purify when pCD = pDC , since in this case we may choose πεCD =
πεCD in the perturbed game, so that (29) is equivalent to (24), with π
ε
DC replacing
πεCC . There is thus no inconsistency between the conditions for optimality at
the four information sets, CC, CD, DC, and DD. Let us assume that the ex
ante value functions satisfy (27) and (28). This, in conjunction with πεCD = π
ε
CD
immediately implies that optimality is satisﬁed at all four information sets. It
remains to show that we can choose the strategy proﬁle πε in order to generate
these ex ante values.
In order to calculate the ex ante values, we need to take into account the
dependence of choice on the realized value of the payoﬀ shock. Note ﬁrst that
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Vaa′(z1t ;D), the ex post payoﬀ from D after aa
′, given the realization of z1t , is
independent of z1t , and
Vaa′(z1t ;C) = Vaa′(zˆ
1
t ;C) + (1− δ) ε
(
z1t − zˆ1t
)
= Vaa′ (D) + (1− δ) ε
(
z1t − zˆ1t
)
,
so
W εCC = VCC (D) + (1− δ) ε
∫ 1
0
max{z − zˆ1t , 0} dz
= VCC (D) + (1− δ) ε
∫ 1
zˆ1t
z − zˆ1t dz
= VCC (D) + (1− δ) ε
(
z2
2
− zzˆ1t
)∣∣∣∣
1
zˆ1t
= VCC (D) + (1− δ) ε
[(
1
2
− zˆ1t
)
+
zˆ1t zˆ
1
t
2
]
= VCC (D) +
(1− δ) ε
2
(
1− zˆ1t
)2 = VCC (D) + (1− δ) ε2 (πεCC)2
and so (using (23))
W εCC = (1− δ)
{
πεCC (1 + g) +
1
2
ε(πεCC)
2
}
+ δ {πεCCW εDC + (1− πεCC)W εDD} .
(30)
Rearranging,
(1− δ)
{
πεCC (1 + g) +
1
2
ε(πεCC)
2
}
+ δπεCC (W
ε
DC −W εDD) + δW εDD −W εCC = 0,
and using (26) and W εCD = W
ε
DC ,
(1− δ)
{
πεCC (1 + g) +
1
2
ε(πεCC)
2
}
+ πεCC (1− δ) (− ε) + δW εDD −W εCC = 0
or
(1− δ)
{
πεCC (1 + g + − ε) +
1
2
ε(πεCC)
2
}
+ δW εDD −W εCC = 0. (31)
Proceeding similarly from the value equation for W εCD, and using (27) and (28),
we have
(1− δ)
{
πεDC (1 + g + − ε) +
1
2
ε(πεDC)
2
}
+ δW εDD −W εCC +
(1− δ)g
δ
= 0. (32)
From the value equation for W εDD,
(1− δ)
{
πεDD (1 + g + − ε) +
1
2
ε(πεDD)
2
}
− (1− δ)W εDD = 0. (33)
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Thus it suﬃces to ﬁnd πεCC , π
ε
CD, and π
ε
DD which solve the quadratics (31),
(32) and (33), and which converge to pCC , pCD, and pDD as ε → 0. We set
W εDD = WDD, and W
ε
CC = WCC , the values in the unperturbed game for the
equilibrium we want to purify. The result then follows from the following lemma
(and (22)):
Lemma 1 Let xε solve the quadratic,
aεx
2 + bεx + cε = 0,
where aε, bε, and cε all converge as ε → 0, and limε→0 aε = 0 and limε→0 bε = 0.
Suppose moreover that aε, bε, and cε are all diﬀerentiable functions of ε in a
neighborhood of 0, with well-deﬁned limits as ε→ 0, and limε→0 a′ε = 0. Then,
lim
ε→0
xε = − limε→0 cεlimε→0 bε .
Proof. Solving the quadratic gives two candidate solutions for xε:
xε =
−bε ±
√
b2ε − 4aεcε
2aε
.
Since the denominator goes to zero as ε → 0, only the positive root yields a well-
deﬁned solution for xε in the limit. In this case, both numerator and denominator
go to zero, and an application of l’Hopital’s rule completes the proof.
Thus, we have a puriﬁcation, for any values of W εDD and W
ε
CC in the un-
perturbed game. Since any completely mixed symmetric equilibrium can be
parametrized by these two values, we have shown that any such equilibrium can
be puriﬁed by one period memory strategies in the perturbed game. We state this
result as the following theorem:
Theorem 3 Let p = (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD) be a symmetric completely mixed one
period memory equilibrium of the unperturbed game Γ(0), with pCD = pDC . There
exists ε¯ > 0 so that for ε < ε¯, there exists πε = (πεCC , π
ε
CD, π
ε
DC , π
ε
DD), a symmetric
one period memory equilibrium of Γ(ε), and πε → p as ε → 0.
Theorems 2 and 3 show that a strategy is puriﬁable by ﬁnite memory strategies
if and only if it is strongly symmetric, i.e., at every information set, the two
players must play the same mixed action. This also has implications for the
payoﬀs that may be sustained. In the unperturbed game, any values in the unit
interval that satisfy (9) and (10) are equilibrium values. In consequence, if δ >
max{ g1+g , 1+}, any value in (0, 1) is an equilibrium value. In the perturbed game,
the restriction WCD = WCD implies that we require δ > g+1+g+ . Thus, supporting
a non-degenerate set of values requires a higher discount factor.
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4 Purification with infinite memory
We now argue that, when we allow the equilibrium of the perturbed game to
have inﬁnite history dependence, then it is possible to purify equilibria of the type
described in Section 2. Fix an equilibrium with interior probabilities, pCC , pCD,
pDC , and pDD ∈ (0, 1).
We ﬁrst partition the set of histories, H, into equivalence classes where behav-
ior is identical on elements of the partition. All histories with the same last action
proﬁle aa′ diﬀerent from CC are equivalent; denote the associated element of the
partition by (aa′, 0). We write this as haa′ ∈ (aa′, 0) for all h and aa′ = CC. Two
histories ending in CC are equivalent if the most recent action proﬁle diﬀerent
from CC in the two histories is the same, aa′ say, and if the same number of
occurrences of CC occur in the two histories after the last non -CC action proﬁle,
aa′. Denote the associated element of the partition by (aa′, k), where k is the
number of occurrences of CC after the last non-CC action proﬁle, aa′. Finally, if
h is the k-period history in which CC has been played in every period, we write
(CC, k) for the singleton element of the partition containing h. Note that the null
history is (CC, 0). Note that, any history in an element of the partition (aa′, k)
with k ≥ 1 ends in CC.
The strategy in the perturbed game will be measurable with respect to the
partition on H just described. Fix ε > 0 and let πεaa′(k) denote the probability
with which C is played when h ∈ (aa′, k), and let W εaa′(k) denote the ex ante
value function of the player at this history. If
{
πεaa′(k)
}
is a sequence (as ε → 0)
of equilibria purifying p = (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD), then πεaa′(k)→ pCC for all k ≥ 1
and all aa′, and pεaa′(0)→ paa′ , as ε → 0. We will indeed show a uniform form of
puriﬁability: the bound on ε required to make πεaa′(k) close to pCC is independent
of k.
The idea is that in the perturbed game, the payoﬀ after a history ending
in CC can always be adjusted to ensure that the appropriate realization of z
in the previous period is the marginal type to obtain the desired randomization
between C and D. We proceed recursively, ﬁxing probabilities after any history
in an element of the partition (aa′, 0) at their unperturbed levels, i.e., we set
πεaa′(0) = paa′ . In particular, players randomize in the ﬁrst period with probability
pCC on C, and in the second period after a realized action proﬁle aa′ = CC with
probability paa′ on C.4 This turns out to determine the value function at histories
in (aa′, 0) for all aa′; we write W εaa′ for W
ε
aa′(0). In the second period after CC,
W εCC(1) is determined by the requirement that the ex ante probability that a player
play C in the ﬁrst period is given by πεCC(0) = pCC . Given the value W
ε
CC(1), the
probability πεCC(1) is then determined by the requirement that W
ε
CC(1) be the ex
ante value at the history CC. More generally, given a history h ∈ (aa′, k) and
a further realization of CC, W εaa′(k + 1) is determined by the requirement that
4More precisely, player 1 randomizes with probability paa′ and player 2 randomizes with
probability pa′a.
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the ex ante probability that a player play C in the previous period is given by
πεaa′(k) = paa′ , and then π
ε
aa′(k + 1) is then determined by W
ε
aa′(k + 1).
We begin with histories in (aa′, 0). Recalling the calculations that led to (30),
W εCD = (1− δ)
{
pDC (1 + g) + εp2CD/2
}
+ δ {pDCW εDC + (1− pDC)W εDD} , (34)
W εDC = (1− δ)
{
pCD (1 + g) + εp2DC/2
}
+ δ {pCDW εDC + (1− pCD)W εDD} , (35)
W εDD = (1− δ)
{
pDD (1 + g) + εp2DD/2
}
+δ {pDDW εDC + (1− pDD)W εDD} , (36)
and
W εaa′(k) = (1− δ)
{
πεa′a(k) (1 + g) + επ
ε
aa′(k)
2/2
}
(37)
+δ {πεa′a(k)W εDC + (1− πεa′a(k))W εDD} .
As we indicated above, (34), (35), and (36) can be solved for W εCD, W
ε
DC , and
W εDD. Moreover, these solutions converge to WCD, WDC , and WDD (since these
are the only solutions to (3), (5) and (7) for ﬁxed pDC , pCD, and pDD). It remains
to determine W εaa′(k) and π
ε
aa′(k) for k ≥ 1 (W εCC(0) is also determined, since
πεCC(0) = pCC).
At the history h = (a′a, k − 1), the player with payoﬀ realization z = 1 −
πεa′a(k − 1) must be indiﬀerent between C and D:
(1− δ) {πεaa′ (k − 1) + (1− πεaa′ (k − 1)) (−) + ε (1− πεa′a (k − 1))}
+δ {πεaa′ (k − 1)W εa′a (k) + (1− πεaa′ (k − 1))W εCD}
= (1− δ)πεaa′ (k − 1) (1 + g) + δ {πεaa′ (k − 1)W εDC + (1− πεaa′ (k − 1))W εDD} .
Solving for W εa′a(k) as a function of π
ε
aa′(k − 1) and πεa′a(k − 1) gives
W εa′a(k) =
(1− δ) (g − )
δ
+ W εDC + W
ε
CD −W εDD (38)
+
(1− δ) − ε (1− πεa′a (k − 1))− δ[W εCD −W εDD]
δπεaa′(k − 1)
.
Given W εaa′(k), (37) is a quadratic in π
ε
aa′(k),
aεπ
ε
aa′(k)
2 + bεπεaa′(k) + cε(k) = 0,
where
aε = ε/2,
bε = (1− δ) (1 + g) + δ (W εDC −W εDD) ,
and
cε(k) = δW εDD −W εaa′(k).
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Applying Lemma 1,
lim
ε→0
πεaa′(k) =
limε→0 W εaa′(k)− δW εDD
limε→0 (1− δ) (1 + g) + δ
(
W εDC −W εDD
) .
Hence, if W εaa′(k)→WCC as ε → 0, then πεaa′(k)→ pCC .
Theorem 4 Let pp = (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD) be a symmetric completely mixed one
period memory equilibrium of the unperturbed game Γ(0). For all η > 0, there is
exists ε (η) > 0 such that for all ε < ε(η), the equilibrium of the perturbed game
Γ(ε) given by the probabilities πεaa′(k) described above satisﬁes
|πεaa′ (k)− pCC | < η ∀k ≥ 1.
Proof. The proof of l’Hospital’s rule (see Rudin (1976, p. 109), for example)
shows the following: Suppose f and g are diﬀerentiable on (a, b), g′(x) = 0 for all
x ∈ (a, b), and there exists δ : [0, η¯]→ + for some η¯ > 0 such that |x− a| < δ(η)
implies |f ′(x)/g′(x)−A| < η for some A for all η ∈ (0, η¯). If f and g are continuous
on [a, b) with f(a) = g(a) = 0, then |f(x)/g(x)−A| < η for all |x− a| < δ(η) and
η ∈ (0, η¯).
Consequently, it is enough to show that δ can be chosen independently of k
in the application of Lemma 1. To apply Lemma 1, we also need to show that b′ε
and c′ε have well-deﬁned limits as ε → 0.
From (34), (35), and (36), there exists κaa′ such that W εaa′ = Waa′ + κaa′ε for
all aa′ = CC. Fix η < min{pCC/3, pCD, pDC , pDD}. We proceed by induction.
We ﬁrst prove the inductive step, and then the initial step.
Suppose k ≥ 2, ∣∣πεaa′(k − 1)− pCC∣∣ < η and ∣∣ε ddεπεaa′(k − 1)∣∣ < 2η for all aa′.
Since
πεaa′(k) =
−bε +
√
b2ε − 2εcε(k)
ε
,
it is enough to consider the behavior of the derivative of the numerator (the deriva-
tive of the denominator being 1). The numerator’s derivative is
−b′ε +
1
2
(
b2ε − 2εcε(k)
)2 [2bεb′ε − 2cε(k)− 2εc′ε(k)] . (39)
If εcε(k) and εc′ε(k) can be made small (we will show that εcε(k) and εc′ε(k) can
be made small by choosing ε small, independently of k), the limiting value of this
derivative is determined by the limiting value of cε(k)/bε (which is pCC).
First we argue that the rate at which cε(k)/bε converges to its limiting value
of pCC is independent of k: Since πεaa′ (k − 1) > pCC/3 > 0, as ε → 0, the last
term in (38) converges to zero (from (9)) uniformly in k. Equations (10) and (9)
then imply W εaa′ (k)→WCC as ε → 0.
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It is immediate that cε(k) is bounded independently of k; it remains to bound
c′ε(k) = δκDD − ddεW εaa′(k). Now,
d
dε
W εaa′(k) = κDC + κCD − κDD
+
(1− δ) − ε (1− πεa′a (k − 1))− δ[W εCD −W εDD]
δ
(
πεaa′(k − 1)
)2 ddεπεaa′(k − 1)
+
1
δπεaa′(k − 1)
{
−1 + πεa′a (k − 1) + ε
d
dε
πεa′a (k − 1)− δ[κCD − κDD]
}
= κDC + κCD − κDD −
(
1− πεa′a (k − 1) + δ[κCD − κDD]
)
δπεaa′(k − 1)
+
δ(κCD − κDD)ε− ε
(
1− πεa′a (k − 1)
)
δ
(
πεaa′(k − 1)
)2 ddεπεaa′(k − 1)
+
ε
δπεaa′(k − 1)
d
dε
πεa′a (k − 1)
(where we have used W εCD −W εDD = WCD −WDD + κCDε−κDDε = (1− δ)/δ +
(κCD − κDD)ε). Hence,∣∣∣∣ ddεW εaa′(k)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |κDC + κCD − κDD|+ (1 + δ |κCD − κDD|)δpCC/3
+
(δ |κCD − κDD|+ 1) ε
δ (pCC/3)
2
∣∣∣∣ ddεπεaa′(k − 1)
∣∣∣∣
+
ε
δpCC/3
∣∣∣∣ ddεπεa′a (k − 1)
∣∣∣∣
≤ A,
(using
∣∣πεaa′(k − 1)− pCC∣∣ < η < pCC/3 in the ﬁrst inequality, and the bound on∣∣ε ddεπεaa′(k − 1)∣∣ in the second) for some A (independent of k). Hence,∣∣c′ε(k)∣∣ ≤ δκDD + A.
Thus, there is a bound, ε¯(η), on ε (independent of k) such that εcε(k) and εc′ε(k)
are suﬃciently small for ε < ε¯(η) that the expression in (39) is within η of pCC .
Hence, from the observation on l’Hopital’s rule at the beginning of the proof,∣∣πεaa′(k)− pCC∣∣ ≤ η.
We also have the bound on the derivative of the probability, since
ε
∣∣∣∣ ddεπεaa′(k)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ ddεεπεaa′(k)− πεaa′(k)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ ddεεπεaa′(k)− pCC
∣∣∣∣+ |pCC − πεaa′(k)| ≤ 2η,
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where the last inequality follows from ddεεπ
ε
aa′(k) equalling the expression in (39).
Finally, it remains to verify that
∣∣πεaa′(1)− pCC∣∣ < η and ∣∣ε ddεπεaa′(1)∣∣ < 2η for
all aa′. It is immediate that for each aa′, there exists εaa′(η) such that the two in-
equalities hold for ε < εaa′(η). Taking ε(η) = min{ε¯(η), εCC(η), εCD(η), εDC(η), εDD(η)}
completes the proof.
5 Private Monitoring
As noted in the introduction, much of the interest in the puriﬁability of mixed
strategy equilibria in repeated games comes from the literature on repeated game
with private monitoring. The systems of equations for the perfect monitoring
case can be straightforwardly extended to allow for private monitoring. Unfor-
tunately, the particular arguments that we report exploit the perfect monitoring
structure to reduce the inﬁnite system of equations to simple diﬀerence equations,
and somewhat diﬀerent arguments are required to deal with private monitoring.
We conjecture that the inﬁnite horizon puriﬁcation results would extend us-
ing general methods for analyzing inﬁnite systems of equations. Intuitively, pri-
vate monitoring will make puriﬁcation by ﬁnite history strategies much harder, as
there will be many diﬀerent histories that will presumably give rise to diﬀerent
equilibrium beliefs that must lead to identical mixed strategies being played, and
this should not typically occur. This argument can be formalized for one period
histories, but we have not established the argument for arbitrary ﬁnite history
strategies. However, we believe that the ﬁnite history restriction may place very
substantial bounds on the set of mixed strategies that can be puriﬁed in general
repeated games, and we hope to pursue this issue in later work.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Solving (11-14) for the probabilities gives (18-21). By construction, all relevant
incentive constraints are satisﬁed, so it only remains to verify that (15), (16),
and (17) imply that the quantities described by (18-21) are indeed well-deﬁned
probabilities. Observe ﬁrst that pCC > 0, since
0 < (1− δ)  + WCC − δWCD
⇐⇒ δWCD < (1− δ)  + WCC ,
which is implied by (16). This then implies that every denominator is positive
(since WCC ≤ 1). Moreover, under this assumption, pCC < 1, since
(1− δ)  + WCC − δWCD < (1− δ) (1 + ) + δ (WCC −WCD)
⇐⇒ (1− δ) (WCC −WCD) < (1− δ)
⇐⇒ WCC −WCD < 1,
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which is always satisﬁed (since WCD ≥ 0).
Turning to the next quantity, pDC > 0, since
0 < (1− δ)  + WCD − δWCD
⇐⇒ 0 <  + WCD,
which always holds. Moreover, pDC < 1, since
(1− δ)  + WCD − δWCD < (1− δ) (1 + ) + δ (WCC −WCD)
⇐⇒ (1− δ)WCD − δ (WCC −WCD) < (1− δ)
⇐⇒ WCD − δWCC < 1− δ.
which is (15).
We also have pCD > 0, since
0 < (1− δ) (− g/δ) + WCC − δWCD
⇐⇒ δWCD + (1− δ) g/δ < (1− δ)  + WCC ,
which is (16). Moreover, pCD < 1, since
(1− δ) (− g/δ) + WCC − δWCD < (1− δ) (1 + ) + δ (WCC −WCD)
⇐⇒ WCC −WCD < 1 + g/δ.
Finally, pDD > 0 is equivalent to (17), and pDD < 1 is implied by (15), since
(1− δ)  (1− 1/δ) + WCD − δWCD < (1− δ) (1 + ) + δ (WCC −WCD)
⇐⇒ WCD − δWCC < (1− δ) (1 + δ) /δ.
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